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ABSTRACT Introduction: While life standards have substantially ameliorated in Brazil, the last few years witnessed a slow-growing
economy, raising concerns on whether educational and public health improvements will endure. Questions are posed regarding how
governments countrywide may shelter against economic turbulence and keep improving social conditions through rainy days. In par-
ticular, what public policy can do to sustain or even increase human development (HD) in the absence of economic growth (EG)? Ma-
terials and Methods: This study explores the sociodemographic and budgetary traits of Brazilian municipalities that experienced
less-than-expected growth in the Municipal Human Development Index (MHDI)’s income dimension, nonetheless advanced more
than expected on schooling and longevity. Municipalities whose mean per capita income advanced less than foreseen were grouped
according to growth in MHDI’s social dimensions. Chances of falling into a given group were estimated through a multinomial logit
model. Results: The analysis suggests that, in a stalled or slow economy, the probability of social improvement is sensitive to families’
income level, educational achievement in households with children, local budget composition and apportionment, age and size of
population, and already existing HD levels. Discussion: I argue that non-income influences - namely, public policy from central and
local governments - can have substantive effects on HD, containing losses or even promoting HD advancements amidst an unfavor-
able economy. Such assertion builds upon works from Development Studies, adapting them from the cross-country perspective to the
cross-municipality level. Additionally, research on decentralization and fiscal federalism provide grounds for adjusting the theoretical
model. A more balanced countrywide distribution of family and government resources foreshadows lesser vulnerability through rainy
days.
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I. Introduction1
Since the late twentieth century, improvements in social conditions haveleft behind the status of a by-product of economic growth (EG), to be-come reputed by the development theory as a critical input to income ex-
pansion (Sen 1999; Ranis, Stewart & Ramirez 2000; Evans & Heller 2015).
Concomitantly, the broad notion of human development (HD), “defined as im-
proving the choices of individuals to enable them to lead longer, healthier and
fuller lives” (Suri et al., 2011, 506), gained notoriety as a depiction of what de-
velopment should aim. The two-way causation between EG and HD has since
been extensively noted (Ranis, Stewart & Ramirez 2000; Ranis & Stewart 2001;
Baldacci et al., 2008; Suri et al., 2011).
However, what is of HD in a scenario of growth contraction or even down-
turn? HD can improve in the absence of income raises, and the latter may not en-
tail the former. Simply put, “there is no automatic link between income and
human development” (UNDP 2015, p.56). As a first reason for that, the sheer
amount of resources controlled or produced by a community tells nothing about
how they are distributed among members. Second, mere acquiring of income is
no guarantee that it will be allocated according to priorities and long-term deci-
sions that build HD. Third, the outcome of such decisions is determined, but
only partially, by the amount spent - quantity and quality are distinct concepts.
Finally, on top of individual choices, societies are impacted by the action of
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governments. Here, too, the three first points apply: public policies concur to re-
distribute capital, to establish and pursue specific priorities, and they may do so
to a greater or lesser degree of efficiency and quality.
In particular, what can public policy do to sustain or even increase HD in the
absence of EG? This work sets out to explore possible intervening factors, espe-
cially those linked to local government spending, that could help understand
contexts in which social indicators advance despite a stalled economy. This is a
notably relevant topic in current Brazil. While the country has substantially im-
proved its living standards, the last few years witnessed an economic slow-
down, raising concerns on whether educational and public health improvements
will endure the harsh budgetary cuts since 2014 and the 2015-6 recession. Most
importantly, questions are posed regarding how governments countrywide may
shelter against economic turbulence and keep improving social conditions
through rainy days.
I argue that non-income influences - namely, public policy from central and
local governments - can have substantive effects on HD, containing losses or
even promoting HD advancements amidst an unfavourable economy. Such as-
sertion builds upon works from Development Studies (e.g., Baldacci et al.,
2008; Suri et al., 2011), but extrapolates and adapts them from the cross-coun-
try perspective to the cross-municipality level. Additionally, research on decen-
tralisation of public policy responsibilities and fiscal federalism (e.g., Arretche
2012; Soares & Melo 2016; Bueno 2017) provides the grounds for adjusting the
models of HD to the context of Brazilian municipalities.
Specifically, this study searches for shared sociodemographic and budget-
ary traits of over 1,800 Brazilian localities whose Municipal Human Develop-
ment Index (MHDI)’s income dimension advanced less than anticipated,
however at the same time experienced more than expected growth in schooling
and longevity over the 2000-2010 period. Beyond the practical relevance of the
object, the present study brings new evidence on non-income factors influenc-
ing HD at the municipality level and evaluates the impact of local budget
sources and applications on HD.
The remainder pages are organised as follows. Section II reports the theoret-
ical understanding of the relationship between HD dimensions and synthesises
empirical studies on HD convergence - which are the basis for calculating ex-
pected MHDI growth rates. Section III covers public policies as forces that
shape HD, with a focus on the decentralisation of education and health services
provision, state capacity, sources and spending autonomy in local budgets, and
lays down hypotheses. Section IV explains the methodology. Regression esti-
mates are presented in Section V; results are discussed in the concluding sec-
tion.
II. Multiple influences over HD
II.1. A complex system of interwoven connections
As it would be expected of a rather ample concept, HD is affected by and af-
fects a long list of socioeconomic factors. The two-way relationship between
economic progress and HD was charted by Ranis, Stewart & Ramirez (2000),
Ranis & Stewart (2001), and Suri et al. (2011). Given past EG, families, govern-
ments and the civil society make allocative decisions on consumption (e.g., in
better nutrition) and investment (e.g., saving for college) that are, to a greater or
lesser degree, HD-enhancing. Naturally, EG is itself modified by family, gov-
ernment and civil society actions. The emerging picture is that of a deeply inter-
connected system of direct, indirect and feedback links shaping HD. With this
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complexity level, no automatic causation between income rise and the latitude
of human choices should be taken for granted.
For the sake of parsimony, take the two sets of players that most directly af-
fect HD. Income levels import for a country’s education and health indicators
(e.g., Baldacci et al., 2008; Suri et al., 2011). However, families’ resources are
not well depicted by country, state or local averages; income inequality has to
be accounted for, as well as the extent to which poverty has been alleviated. In
spite of a higher propensity to consume HD-related items, low-income families
are doomed to a limited acquisition of such items. Notwithstanding, after con-
trolling for income inequality and other quality of life aspects, income level
tends to lose statistical significance as a predictor of morbidity and mortality
(Kenny 2005). Moreover, in the decision dynamics within families, gender and
schooling of household heads - those in charge of finances, often the family
member who accrues the largest income share - make a difference. Women-
headed households tend to spend more in HD-enhancing goods and services,
such as groceries, water and education (Ranis, Stewart & Ramirez 2000);
women’s education positively correlates with the probability of controlling do-
mestic allocative choices and is itself a driving force for ameliorating nutrition
and child survival rates (Schultz 2002).
Beyond improved allocation of available resources, the very nature of these
resources is crucial. Departing from an income-centric perspective, Ranis &
Stewart (2001, 6) defend that social capital, “the available horizontal links
among actors”, may amplify the benefits from EG - or mute the consequences of
a downtrend. Also, any reasonable account to the plunge in mortality rates over
the 1900s would have to include knowledge, science and technology, argue
Cutler, Deaton and Lleras-Muney (2006). Understanding of available technolo-
gies may cheapen HD inputs (e.g., preventive medical care, adequate nutrition
and quality education), and the latter may reinforce each other through symbi-
otic connections. Consider, for instance, how vaccines and some inexpensive
interventions (e.g., professionally training midwives) dramatically reduce
health care costs (Ranis & Stewart 2001; Kenny 2005; 2009), and the potential
boost in schooling, nutrition and self-esteem brought by conditional cash trans-
fer programs such as Oportunidades (formerly known as Progresa) in Mexico
and Programa Bolsa Família, in Brazil. Besides, there is evidence of a robust
and bilateral association between education and health, in part supported by the
fact that formally educated people are more likely to assimilate medical and
sanitation technologies (Kenny 2005; 2009; for links between education and
health, see Weare 2002; Oliveira 2005; Cutler & Lleras-Muney 2006; Feinstein
et al., 2006; and Brunello et al., 2011).
II.2. Convergence in HD
Factors touched upon in previous paragraphs tell a story about a multi-
causal phenomenon, whose determinants are of varied natures and find them-
selves intertwined by complex bonds. Put this way it is not surprising that in-
come growth is only one facet of HD and that it may not guarantee the latter.
However, there is more to it. Initial levels, of both income and other quality of
life indicators, also dictate the speed of HD growth. The marginal effect of in-
come on HD tends to decline (Kenny 2005), and an overall pattern of slow but
consistent convergence has been found both cross-country and among Brazilian
municipalities (Karruz & Vale 2015). Bounded indicators certainly play a role
in reducing disparities - after all, no place can go above 100 per cent literacy
rate, and present life expectation will not top the vicinity of 100 years (Kenny
2005; Noorbakhsh 2006).
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Most of the literature on convergence deals with trajectories of per capita in-
come among countries (e.g., Barseghyan & Dicecio 2011; Dhongde & Miao
2013), states (e.g., Galeano 2014) and municipalities (e.g., Coelho & Figuei-
redo 2007; Ferreira & Cruz 2008; Ribeiro & Almeida 2012). A smaller group of
scholars has applied the notion of convergence to report HD trends, and studies
of this nature typically analyse the country level (Kenny 2005; Noorbakhsh
2006; Kónya & Guisan 2008; Mayer-Foulkes 2010; Kónya 2011; Jordá &
Sarabia 2015a; 2015b).
Convergence studies share the concern about spatial inequalities and the
speed at which less advanced regions seem to catch up towards the highest de-
velopment levels experienced by other regions. Most of these studies cite the
seminal works of Robert Solow (1956) and Trevor Swan (1956). These authors
proposed neo-classical growth models predicting that, given perfectly free mar-
kets, capital investments would travel the world after the highest return rates.
With capital’s diminishing returns, best investment opportunities would con-
centrate in the least developed areas, where the stock of capital of capital is
lower. According to this view, regional disparities would disappear, and income
convergence would be expected. An alternative perspective foresees an entirely
different outcome. As per the cumulative circular causation principle, capital
and skilled labour would cluster in certain areas due to economies of scale and
agglomeration, possibly generating a pattern of lingering inequality. This view
has been associated with the work of Myrdal (1968), Dixon and Thirlwall
(1975) and Kaldor (1978), explain Marques and Fochezatto (2012). Note that
income convergence accounts provided above regard markets or territorial units
much more so than a convergence of families’ income.
As an extrapolation from the income studies, HD convergence claims that
diminishing marginal returns apply to non-economic dimensions as well. Here,
the insight is that basic education and health services (e.g., primary education,
immunisation) tend to cost considerably less than their advanced counterparts
(e.g., higher education, open-heart surgery). With the same dollar amount, a
larger quality of life return would accrue in less developed areas, which are still
struggling to meet basic and less expensive demands. HD convergence could
then take place (Kenny 2005; Noorbakhsh 2006).
Empirical research has found slow HD convergence between countries
(Noorbakhsh 2006; Kónya & Guisan 2008; Jordá & Sarabia 2015a). Consider-
ing each HD dimension separately, Mayer-Foulkes (2010) observed a series of
superposed transitions marked by initial divergence followed by periods of con-
vergence, with urbanisation playing a central role in promoting the latter. Social
policies are arguably more straightforward to implement in urban than rural ar-
eas (Kenny 2005), and urban dwellers are more likely to send their children to
school, due to the typically facilitated access and lower private costs of educa-
tion (Gupta, Verhoeven & Tiongson 2002).2 Speed of convergence seems to
vary across dimensions, and has been more accelerated in schooling (Neumayer
2003; Mayer-Foulkes 2010; Jordá & Sarabia 2015a). In the Brazilian context,
municipality-level HD has been predominantly driven by the schooling dimen-
sion (PNUD, IPEA, & FJP 2013).
Primary education and health care, two key HD-inputs, are policy areas in
which Brazilian municipalities take centre stage - and, thus, where service het-
erogeneity is prone to arise. Next section reviews the literature on the HD impli-
cations of public spending in these areas. It also briefly describes the social
services provision landscape in Brazil, touching upon topics of regulation and
funding.
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III. Public policy and HD
III.1. Social spending and HD
Governments play a crucial role in fostering HD as both education and
health are considered public goods. Total budget and apportionment by func-
tion, as well as the distribution of funds between various HD-related programs,
are all impinging upon HD results (Ranis & Stewart 2001).
Based on panel data from 118 developing countries covering years
1975-2000, and after applying several techniques to avoid measurement error
and endogeneity,3 Baldacci et al. (2008) found that expenditures on education
positively associate with accumulations of education capital (primary and sec-
ondary gross enrollment rate). Such connection works through both contempo-
raneous and lagged effects, the latter spanning 10 years. At their turn, positive
effects of health spending do not seem cumulative, being detected only a con-
temporaneous (five-year period) influence over the under-five child mortality
rate. Nevertheless, such positive effects of education and health spending are
contingent on the quality of governance, portrayed by a combination of corrup-
tion and accountability indicators. Poor governance reduces the effects of edu-
cation spending and nullifies those from health spending, report Baldacci et al.
(2008).
Suri et al. (2011) found similar results as they observed panel data ranging
from 1960 to 2001 on around 100 developing countries. Their dependent vari-
able was a composite index representing the portion of the variation of three HD
indicators (infant mortality, life expectancy, and secondary school enrollment)
that is not attributable to a country’s income growth rate alone. Per capita public
expenditure on education and health both showed a positive effect on HD,
whereas income inequality displays a strong adverse effect.
III.2. Decentralisation of education and health services
Public education and health care are highly decentralised, universal services
in Brazil. Public policy decentralisation gained strength in the 1990s, in good
part because of the 1988 Constitution, which was built around a political com-
mitment to empower local communities and to expand municipalities’ taxation
power. Later in that decade, new measures were taken, but now emanating from
a different set of motivations. Brazilian municipalities are extremely unequal -
in population size and composition, economic dynamics, policy needs, manage-
rial capability - and started in very different positions as far as their participation
in supplying social policies. To help levelling the field and to overcome local
fiscal constraints, the federal government passed constitutional amendments to
establish new policy funding designs (Souza 2004), keeping service delivery
(policy-making) local, but concentrating policy decision-making at the central
level, especially in health care and education (Arretche 2012).
A system of incentives (e.g., new funding availability) and sanctions (e.g.,
risk of resource loss or impossibility to tap into new sources), combined with
strong regulation and service protocols, are arguably the critical design features
behind the successful municipalization in primary education and basic public
health (Arretche 2002; 2012; Souza 2004). Since Sistema Único de Saúde
(SUS, the Unified National Health System) was established in 1988, municipal-
ities have opted to become responsible for health services provision. Many have
also adhered to the 1998-launched Fundef (Fundo de Manutenção e Desen-
volvimento do Ensino Fundamental e de Valorização do Magistério, loosely
translated as Fund for Primary Education Maintenance and Development and
Recognition of the Teaching Profession). In 2000, 99.0 per cent of municipali-
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ties had taken over health services supply, whereas municipal schools ac-
counted for 51.4 per cent of primary education enrollment - against 40.7 per
cent in 1997 (Souza 2004).4
Some key legislation deepened decentralization in the following years. In
2000, Amendment 29 regulated local revenues to be spent in health: a minimum
of 7 per cent that year, with yearly increments, reaching 15 per cent by 2004
(Faveret 2003). In 2007, Fundef was replaced by another intergovernmental
fund, Fundeb.5 Municipalities’ contribution to the pooled resources increased
from 15 to 20 per cent of revenues, as childcare/pre-school and secondary edu-
cation were included in the Fundeb per pupil funding calculations. Note that
since the 1988 Constitution, municipalities were obliged to spend at least 25 per
cent of collected taxes on education-related services (art. 212).
In the health front, required minimum investment levels combined with con-
ditioning transfers of federal resources to the supply of specific services raised
ambulatory and family health care, as well as total health expenditures, and low-
ered funding inequalities across the country (Vazquez 2014). In the education
domain, Fundef led to the expansion of enrollment and reduction in intra-state
per pupil spending inequality (Vazquez 2014). Nonetheless, findings have been
ambivalent on the association between municipalization and educational out-
comes - for instance, student performance at standardised tests (Leme, Paredes
& Souza 2009; Ceneviva 2012). Taking Prova Brasil6 scores as the dependent
variable, Domingos, Silva and Souza (2013) found no statistical effect of mu-
nicipality spending, while Amaral and Menezes-Filho (2008) observed a posi-
tive and significant effect only for the communities with top performance. One
potential explanation formulated by the latter authors is that a certain level of
preexisting managerial capability is required to transform additional resources
into quality education. Along the same lines, Diaz (2012) was unable to detect
an impact of local expenditures in education on IDEB (Índice de Desenvol-
vimento da Educação Básica, the Basic Education Development Index), a com-
posite measure that combines both student promotion and learning rates. On the
other hand, Gonçalves and França (2010), Amaral (2011) and Kroth and
Gonçalves (2014) observed a positive influence of local spending on student
performance. From a rather different viewpoint, Soares and Alves (2013) esti-
mated school and municipality effects on Prova Brasil scores as the residuals of
a hierarchical linear model. These effect estimates were poorly correlated with
both per-student costs and the municipality socioeconomic status. Such a result
indicates the existence of differences among local school systems (potentially
regarding more or less adjusted management policies and instructional meth-
ods) that should not be confused with other, more visible cross-municipality
disparities.
Decentralisation of public policy created a heightened need for professio-
nalisation of local public management. To learn about both personnel technical
qualification and potential obstacles to the institutional consolidation of local
bureaucracies, Veloso et al. (2011) surveyed public managers from 194 city
halls of seven Brazilian states. Inspired by the Government Performance Project
(Ingraham, Joyce & Donahue 2003; Ingraham 2007), which assessed the public
management capacity of federal agencies, state governments, counties and
large cities in the United States, the survey addressed four management capacity
components, or subsystems: financial, capital, people, and information technol-
ogy. Veloso et al. (2011) define management capacity as the competence of a
local Executive to meet its goals and legal obligations, according to the public
interest, efficiently and efficaciously, deploying available resources through
adequate management instruments; the concept encompasses the ability to co-
ordinate efforts with other governments and partners too. Some of Veloso et al.
(2011) findings include a high level of financial management outsourcing
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6 A standardized test focused
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of public schools. It is applied
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e Pesquisas Educacionais
Anísio Teixeira, an agency
associated with the Ministry of
Education.
(which the authors deem a potential threat to sustained good fiscal perfor-
mance); poor technical qualification of the teams in charge of capital invest-
ments; and ample disparities in people management strategies.
III.3. Local budgets
Fundeb and SUS-related intergovernmental transfers are only two of several
funding sources for local governments. Soares and Melo (2016) group local
revenues as follows:
a) Those collected directly by municipalities (own revenues), mostly
derived from property taxes and taxation of professional services;
b) Constitutionally mandated transfers, such as Fundo de Partici-
pação dos Municípios (FPM, which redistributes the federal income tax
and the tax on manufactured products), municipalities’ share of the
state-level value-added and vehicle taxes (cotas-partes), and Fundeb;
c) SUS-related transfers;
d) Other legally mandated transfers, including some earmarked re-
sources (e.g., from the Fundo Nacional de Desenvolvimento da Edu-
cação, the National Fund for Education Development), and oil royalties;
e) Discretionary transfers from federal, state or other municipalities’
budgets.7
Soares and Melo (2016) classify these five main sources according to their
associated level of fiscal autonomy and potential to reduce inequalities. Own
revenues enjoy high autonomy and low redistributive potential since they repro-
duce in public coffers the vigour of each local urban economy. That is a particu-
larly relevant point since the present work focuses on communities whose
economy has grown less than expected. If performance on social indicators ex-
ceeds expectation, and if national norms concerning fiscal federalism are homo-
geneously enforced, two of the possible accounts would be that these
municipalities are levying more of their citizens and/or better spending their
revenues. In a scenario of an economic downturn, the more dependent own rev-
enues are on the household income levels (e.g., the more reliant on services ver-
sus property tax), the more acute would the tax burden be on family budgets, all
else constant, ultimately threatening families’ HD-enhancing consumption. As
per the second explanation, the increased share of municipal taxes could imply
stronger state capacities (e.g., those involved in keeping taxpayer registries
up-to-date, collecting outstanding balance). From this viewpoint, Soares and
Melo (2016) use own collections as a proxy for both municipality wealth and
technical capabilities; Marenco, Strohschoen and Joner (2017) observed that in
municipalities where more than 15 per cent of public servants are college gradu-
ates, the odds that the property tax’ share of total revenues is larger than
one-fifth are 80 per cent higher.
Among the constitutionally mandated flows, the FPM was designed as a
redistributive fund, whereas state-level cotas-partes apportion sums proportion-
ate to each municipality’s contribution to the total collected; like Fundef,
Fundeb was meant to be redistributive, especially within states and, in contrast
to FPM and cotas-partes, is earmarked. SUS transfers and most of the other le-
gally imposed ones are redistributive by nature; observe that source d) com-
prises both earmarked and freely allocated funds. Finally, because discretionary
transfers are intended to support specific projects pre-approved by the ceding
government (such as building bridges and water and sewer systems, purchasing
ambulances), they offer little autonomy, and their redistributive potential is yet
to be determined. Available evidence indicates that federal discretionary trans-
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fers favour municipalities with a higher proportion of own collection (Soares &
Melo 2016); these tend to be the bigger cities.8
Nunes (2015) explores the patterns and rationale of federal executive, dis-
cretionary transfers in countries with varying levels of centralization. Data from
Latin America indicate that the more decentralized the nation, the more likely
that these transfers favor municipalities governed by co-partisan mayors, even
after controlling for a series of alternative explanations, including targeting
poverty alleviation. Drawing findings from a regression discontinuity design
applied to the Brazilian case, Brollo and Nannicini (2012, p.759) had also found
a heavy political motivation to these transfers, notably “aimed at penalizing un-
aligned municipalities in which mayors belonging to the opposition coalition
won by a narrow margin.”
Nonetheless, there seems to exist other goals guiding allocation of discre-
tionary transfers. Bueno (2017) identified a bypassing strategy, by which cen-
tral government distributes resources to municipalities with unaligned mayors
through transfers to nonstate public service providers.9 Such transfers are even
less visible to voters than are those to mayors, the former incurring lesser of a
“credit highjacking” risk. Beyond partisan alignment, incumbents (presidents,
governors) care about boosting voters’ welfare, gaining legislative support, mo-
bilising swing voters, and even exchanging transfers for campaign contribu-
tions, explains Bueno (2017).
Efficiency in the application of intergovernmental transfers is most certainly
a concern in a system where average municipality’s share of own revenues is no
larger than 12 per cent of the total budget, warn Costa and Castelar (2015, based
on 1999 to 2009 data). These authors set out to test the flypaper hypothesis,10
which predicts unconditional grants to “increase public expenditures by more
than an equivalent increase in income from other sources,” saving the popular-
ity cost of taxing one’s own constituency and opening space for less rigorous
fiscal policies. Costa & Castelar (2015) found no evidence of the flypaper effect
in Brazilian municipalities, even after analysing different expenditure quantiles.
While the flypaper hypothesis posits lower fiscal responsibility the larger
the share of transfers, one has to consider another narrative, valid to discretion-
ary transfers in particular. To be granted, these transfers require grantee munici-
palities to elaborate a work plan for the intervention being funded, many times
involving an engineering project, an environmental permit and other documents
necessary for public works, thus potentially increasing room for accountabil-
ity.11 Beyond that, Bertholini, Pereira and Rennó (2018, 9) point that discretion-
ary transfers may be a somewhat efficient form of pork because interested poli-
ticians will closely monitor project execution, making sure that “promises will
be accomplished to credibly claim credit for them.” These authors found that
transfers originated from legislator-authored amendments to Brazilian central
government’s annual budgets can generate social and economic inclusion; how-
ever, effects tend to dissipate over time, potentially due to policy investments’
diminishing returns and inflow concentration into specific locales.
III.4. Brazil’s flagship conditional cash transfer
Programa Bolsa Família (PBF) is a federal conditional cash transfer initiated
in 2004 that benefits around 14 million families across the country. Devised
during President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s first term, PBF replaced and inte-
grated a series of other transfers. As a conditional cash transfer, PBF seeks to a)
reduce current poverty and inequality, by providing a minimal income inflow to
low-income families; and b) break the inter-generational transmission of pov-
erty, by establishing incentives for these families to invest in human capital.
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9 Services offered by
organisations of the civil
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HD-enhancing (Ranis, Stewart
& Ramirez 2000). It is not
different in Brazil, where
nonstate providers share de
facto responsibility for main
programs, and receive
discretionary transfers to fund
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(Bueno 2017).
10 The idea behind the name is
that “money sticks to where it
hits,” as first stated by
Marshall (1989, p.4), explain
Dollery and Worthington
(1995, p.23).
11 Such preconditions make
grant application expensive
and skilled labor intensive;
small, poorer, communities
will hardly amass the technical
prerequisites to obtain a
federal discretionary transfer
without help (Soares & Melo
2016).
Transfers are conditioned on beneficiary compliance with requirements (condi-
tionalities), such as school attendance, immunisation, prenatal visits, and partic-
ipation in nutritional programs.
PBF eligible families are identified according to household per capita in-
come (no more than R$ 170 monthly, approximately US$ 50 in 2017 values)
and household composition. A portion of the benefit varies according to the
number of children and adolescents, pregnant or nursing women, and the per ca-
pita income of extremely low-income families (those living with less than R$
85, even after receiving the regular PBF transfers). In December 2017, the aver-
age PBF benefit was about R$ 180 per family (MDS 2018).
A single registry (Cadastro Único) contains information about current and
potential PBF beneficiary families. Municipalities inscribe families (who ac-
tively register or are reached out), feeding Cadastro Único with self-declared
data about their means, household composition, etc.; this registry is periodically
updated and checked against official records, like those related to job participa-
tion. Proper maintenance of the database is critical in the reduction of gaps and
duplications and in avoiding fraud.
Throughout the last decade, several impact studies have attested that PBF
has helped improving living conditions. In particular, income transfers account
for 24 per cent of the per capita income inequality reduction between 1995 and
2006, estimated Silveira Neto (2010). After surveying numerous impact stud-
ies, Jannuzzi and Pinto (2013) ascertained favourable effects of PBF over a
range of socioeconomic indicators, such as increased school attendance, im-
proved performance at large-scale tests, reduced grade retention and child la-
bour. There has also been detected a decline in acute malnutrition and infant
mortality, and a rise in immunisation rates, pre-natal care and birth weight. As
far as the job market, evidence dismisses the hypothesis of a lowered labour
supply on the part of beneficiaries, except for women with children. Further-
more, women - who comprise the almost totality of family members entitled to
withdrawal the cash transfers - show elevated decision power in household allo-
cation choices (e.g., regarding the purchase of durable goods, medicines, and
clothing, as compared to nonbeneficiaries), which helps to reduce intra-family
gender inequalities through empowering.
III.5. Learnings from the literature and proposed argument
The above search for influences over HD has spread to different disciplines
(Economics, Political Science, Education, Public Health), encompassing a great
variety of references and causal claims. To organise the stated arguments and
assist modelling, Chart 1 presents an inventory of such influences. Given the
plethora of factors interfering with one’s health and schooling, not to mention
the interactions between such factors, this list is not exhaustive; on the contrary,
it aims to register only the main associations explored by the reviewed litera-
ture.
The main argument tested in the analyses ahead is that public policy from
central and local governments can have substantive effects on HD. In particular,
variation in discretionary transfers from the federal and state governments to
municipalities, and the HD-oriented spending of local administrations, are ex-
pected to display a positive effect on HD, independently of the local economy’s
vigor. In this sense, social spending could help counteract income fluctuations’
negative effects on living conditions.
Through Rainy Days 129
IV. Data and methodology
IV.1. Data
The empirical analysis ahead draws information from four sources. Data on
2000 and 2010 MHDI, its dimension-specific indexes12 and other demographic
and socioeconomic indicators were extracted from Atlas do Desenvolvimento
Humano no Brasil - an online database built by the Brazilian United Nations
Development Programme office and partners, assembling HD-related data for
multiple subnational territorial units. Local budgetary information was re-
trieved from Finbra – Finanças do Brasil, which publicises revenues and imple-
mented yearly budget values as per declared by municipalities to the Secretaria
do Tesouro Nacional, a division of the Brazilian Finance Ministry. Other bud-
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Chart 1 - Influences over HD that have been identified in the reviewed literature
Source Influence over HD References
Families Resource availability
Income level Baldacci et al. (2008); Ranis & Stewart (2001); Ranis, Stewart
& Ramirez (2000); Suri et al. (2011)
Income inequality Kenny (2005); Suri et al. (2011)
Resource application
Gender of household head Ranis & Steward (2001); Ranis, Stewart & Ramirez (2000)
Schooling of household head Kenny (2005, 2009)
Women’s schooling Ranis & Stewart (2001); Schultz (2002)
Governments Resource availability
Own collection Soares & Melo (2016); Veloso et al. (2011)
Intergovernmental transfers Bertholini, Pereira & Rennó (2018); Brollo & Nannicini
(2012); Bueno (2017); Nunes (2015); Soares & Melo (2016)
State capacity (e.g., to collect taxes, apply
for grants)
Ingraham (2007); Ingraham, Joyce & Donahue (2003);
Marenco, Strohschoen & Joner (2017); Soares & Melo (2016);
Veloso et al. (2011)
Resource application
Distribution of efforts across programs
(those HD-focused or otherwise)
Baldacci et al. (2008); Jannuzzi & Pinto (2013); Ranis & Stew-
art (2001); Silveira Neto (2010); Suri et al. (2011)
State capacity (to formulate and imple-
ment well adjusted, efficient policies)
Amaral & Menezes-Filho (2008); Baldacci et al. (2008); Costa
& Castelar (2015); Ingraham (2007); Ingraham, Joyce &
Donahue (2003); Soares & Alves (2013); Veloso et al. (2011)
Civil society Resource availability Bueno (2017); Ranis & Steward (2001); Ranis, Stewart &
Ramirez (2000)
Resource application
Initial context Vigor of local and national economies Ranis & Steward (2001); Ranis, Stewart & Ramirez (2000)
Social capital Ranis & Stewart (2001)
Available technologies Cutler, Deaton & Lleras-Muney (2006)
Strength of associations between HD in-
puts
Baldacci et al. (2008); Kenny (2005, 2009); Ranis & Steward
(2001)
Demand for HD (age profile, level of ur-
banization, population size etc.)
Gupta, Verhoeven & Tingson (2002); Kenny (2005);
Mayer-Foulkes (2010); Veloso et al. (2011)
HD levels Jordá & Sarabia (2015a, 2015b); Karruz & Vale (2015); Kenny
(2005); Kónya (2011); Kónya & Guisan (2008);
Mayer-Foulkes (2010); Newmayer (2003); Noorbakhsh (2006)
Source: The author.
12 The MHDI combines three
dimension-specific indexes.
Income MHDI is based on the
average income of all
inhabitants of the
municipality. Longevity




getary indicators come from Rio de Janeiro’s Federation of Industries, Sistema
Firjan. The fourth source is the website of the Ministério do Desenvolvimento
Social (Ministry of Social Development), from which data on PBF were down-
loaded through the platform Matriz de Informação Social (the Social Informa-
tion Matrix).
All these pieces of data were combined and organised as a panel whose unit
of analysis is municipality-year, covering the 5.565 existing municipalities in
2010. Years include 2000 and 2010, except for budgetary and PBF variables -
for which decade averages were calculated based on yearly values.
IV.2. Grouping
Two major analytical steps are undertaken in this work. First, identification
of the municipalities with slower-than-expected income growth and, within
these, those with either above- or below-expected trends in schooling and lon-
gevity.
Grouping municipalities according to changes in their social indicators is a
variation of the approach used by Ranis, Stewart and Ramirez (2000) and Suri et
al. (2011). Both studies classify the trajectory of developing countries in the
second half of the twentieth century into four categories: (i) virtuous cycle, for
those showing above-average advancements in both HD and EG; (ii) vicious
cycle, for countries performing below average in both dimensions; (iii) EG-lop-
sided, for cases with worse-than-average changes in HD but above-average EG;
and (iv) HD-lopsided, the symmetrical category for (iii). Empirical evidence in-
dicates that “policies to improve HD must precede or at least complement
growth-oriented policies if growth is to be accelerated and sustainable” (Suri et
al., 2011, 519), a finding with direct implications over policy sequencing.
The present study focuses on categories (ii) and (iv), where EG is less than
expected. Specifically, it aims at finding out what sets (ii) and (iv) apart. Differ-
ently from Ranis, Stewart and Ramirez (2000) and Suri et al. (2011), here the
HD dimension is broken down into the longevity and schooling components,
each with its own (above or below expectation) trajectory over the 2000s. This
approach allows for more granularity in the investigation on potential influ-
ences of governments’ spending on health and education standards.
A well-documented pattern of HD-convergence, discussed earlier, provides
the theoretical grounds for estimating annual growth rates for each MHDI di-
mension. Equation (I), a simple convergence model adapted from Jordá and
Sarabia (2015a), was applied to calculate unconditional convergence rates and
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Figure 1, below, portrays scatter plots of the convergence analysis’ depend-
ent and independent variables, as well as of the general MHDI. A negative slope
is visible in each panel, pointing out that the larger the 2000 value, the smaller
the expected 2000-2010 growth, all else constant.
All four indicators analysed show a convergence pattern, as per the esti-
mated slope coefficients (Table 1). Convergence seems most intense in school-
ing and least in income; still, initial income dimension levels solely explain 53.9
per cent of variation around the mean. All else constant, a one per cent increase
in 2000 Income MHDI associates with a 0.029 per cent decrease in its expected
annualised 2010-2000 ratio.
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middle and high school
graduation rates. All three
dimension indicators range
from zero to one (the greater,
the better the HD).
Municipalities with 2000-2010 observed income growth rates smaller than
the lower limit value of a 95 per cent confidence interval around the predicted
dependent variable are kept in the working sample, all other ones being re-
moved from it. Following the same tactics, are then excluded localities whose
observed longevity (schooling) growth rate falls within the estimated confi-
dence interval for the respective dimension. The sample is reduced to 2,482 mu-
nicipalities, each classified in one of the four groups described in Chart 2.
Group 1 congregates cases where all three dimensions grew less than fore-
seen and are nicknamed double social loss group. Group 4, on the other ex-
treme, is the double social gain one. Groups 2 and 3 combine some social gain
with some social loss. Because no arbitrary judgment regarding the relative val-
ues of longevity and schooling are made, it is not possible to order the four
groups based on their desirability, although 1 and 4 are the least and most fa-
vourable clusters.
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Note: N = 5,565 municipalities in all four panels (1.a to 1.d).
Source: The author, based on raw data from Atlas do Desenvolvimento Humano no Brasil.
Figure 1 - Growth rates by initial value: MHDI and its dimensions (2000-2010)
IV.3. Multivariate modelling
The second analytical step gets to the core goal of this work: to map charac-
teristics of family and policy environments, as well as of the demand for social
services, that seem to associate with an elevated chance to escape the double so-
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Multiple equations (J - 1) are estimated, being J here equal four, the number
of groups. The dependent variable is the log-odds of falling in group j relative to
J, the referent one - set to be the double social loss group. A constant (
) and a
series of linear slope coefficients () are predicted in each equation. Vector X
contains the independent variables (see Chart 3), many of which are paired with
a respective measure of change within the 2000s (to account, where possible,
for variation within the relatively long ten-year time window). X also includes a
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Table 1 - Regression estimates from the convergence models (2000-2010)
Variable MHDI Income MHDI Longevity MHDI Schooling MHDI
Log 2000 MHDI -0.049*
(0.000)
Log 2000 Income MHDI -0.029*
(0.000)
Log 2000 Longevity MHDI -0.046*
(0.000)
Log 2000 Schooling MHDI -0.061*
(0.000)
Constant -0.008* -0.005* -0.005* -0.016*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 5,565 5,565 5,565 5,565
R2 0.907 0.539 0.734 0.914
Notes: Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. * p < 0.01.
Source: The author, based on raw data from Atlas do Desenvolvimento Humano no Brasil.
Chart 2 - Grouping of municipalities
Group Observed 2010 MHDI dimension* Sample size
Income Longevity Schooling Initial n (%) Working n
(%)**
1 – Double social loss Below lower Below lower Below lower 667 (27) 622 (27)
2 – Longevity gain, schooling loss Above upper 676 (27) 642 (27)
3 – Longevity loss, schooling gain Below lower Above upper 566 (23) 539 (23)
4 – Double social gain Above upper 573 (23) 542 (23)
All four groups As detailed above 2,482 (100) 2,345 (100)
Source: The author, based on raw data from Atlas do Desenvolvimento Humano no Brasil
Notes: * In relation to the bounds of the respective dimension’s confidence interval, calculated through the convergence analy-
sis. ** With complete budgetary data (see subsection IV.6 for details).
set of dummies for states, to control for unobserved cross-state heterogeneity
that is constant over the 2000-2010 period;13  is the stochastic term. Robust
standard errors are estimated to tackle heteroscedasticity. By exponentiating the
estimated parameters, one can project the influence of each explanatory vari-
able in the risk of pertaining to a given group relative to the referent one, all else
constant. The relative risk ratio (RRR) consists of a ratio of two probabilities, in
this case, the probability to belonging to group j (ij) over the probability to be-
longing to the double social loss one (iJ); e

 is interpreted as a multiplicative
effect on RRR.
All else constant, the expectation is that municipalities with a lower income
or a higher Gini coefficient (a measure of per capita household income concen-
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Chart 3 - Explanatory variables in the multinomial logit model
Source Influence over HD Variable (level) Variable (as change) Raw data
Families Income level + 2000 Average per capita
income
2000-2010% change Atlas do Desenvol-vimento
Humano no Brasil
Income inequality - 2000 Gini (0-100) 2000-2010 change
Schooling of household
head
- 2000% of children in
households with no middle
school graduates
2000-2010 change
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13 An alternative specification
was tried, with random
intercepts at the state level.
Random intercept estimates
are directionally similar; they
are displayed in Appendix
Table 1 for reference.
tration) will suffer more from a slow economic scenario since many families
will have insufficient resources to cater for their education and health care
needs. The higher the per cent of children (up to 14 years old) living in house-
holds without a middle school graduate, the lower the expected advancements
in health and education. Such variable reports the share of children in house-
holds where the cultural capital is underprivileged, with potential implications
on adults’ employability and resourcefulness - e.g., in helping the schooling of
children and fostering their health.
The second set of covariates concerns the potential of local governments to
execute public policies, through the lenses of resource availability and applica-
tion. It controls for per capita total revenues in 2000, as well as by its average
year-to-year per cent growth rate. Importantly, given the constitutional floor
percentages to be engaged in education and health, the higher the total revenue,
the higher the nominal values deployed in such functions. Total revenues are
then broken down considering: a) how much originates from own collection,
and b) how much comes from the federal and state governments in the form of
discretionary transfers. The hypothesis is that a) positively correlates with town
hall’s capability to levy taxes (e.g., via higher tax burden, more efficient collec-
tion), which could indicate a highly skilled bureaucracy (Marenco, Strohschoen
& Joner 2017) - similarly capable of executing well-adjusted social policies. As
far as b), the hypothesis is also in the positive side: while discretionary transfers
are not necessarily redistributive, they require a good level of bureaucratic re-
sourcefulness from local governments, and here too an expectation regarding
overall administrative capability is tenable; not the least, the very projects
funded by discretionary transfers may be HD-enhancing (Bertholini, Pereira &
Rennó 2018). From the expenditures perspective, local investment in education,
culture, health and sanitation should positively influence social indicators, both
directly by the primary function and indirectly, through the effects of one’s
good education on health status (and vice versa).
Alongside the detailed budgetary variables, the Índice Firjan de Gestão Fis-
cal (IFGF, the Firjan Fiscal Management Index), calculated by the Federation of
Industries of the State of Rio de Janeiro, is taken both as a measure of resource
availability and as a proxy for state capacity (e.g., to collect taxes, formulate ef-
ficient policies). IFGF was conceived to portray challenges faced by local
administrations across the country, especially those regarding resource insuffi-
ciency and the burden of debt. It comprises five indicators, all ranging from zero
to one (the greater, the better the fiscal management), just like the composite
IFGF itself. IFGF touches upon the following dimensions: capacity to obtain
revenue (own collection); capacity to make investments; the degree of budget-
ary rigidity (proportion of revenues used to pay personnel); fund availability to
meet short-term obligations; and the cost of long-term debt (Sistema Firjan
2015).
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Source Influence over HD Variable (level) Variable (as change) Raw data
HD levels + 2000 Longevity quartile:
Lowest
+ 2000 Schooling quartile:
Lowest
Source: The author.
Notes: (0-100) = In a 0 to 100 scale. * Due to differences in the Finbra accounting scheme over the years, no comparable values
are available for 2000 and 2001. ** 2006 is the earliest year for which IFGF is available. *** 2007 is the earliest year for which
IGD is available. - Negative hypothesized influence over HD; + Positive hypothesized influence over HD; for change variables,
hypotheses are the same as those for the respective level.
Additionally, the governments’ set of variables includes two measures re-
garding PBF. One concerns program reach (in relation to the number of target
families); by fighting extreme poverty and imposing education and health care
conditions to participation, the program is expected to improve HD among the
most vulnerable.14 The other corresponds to the Índice de Gestão Descentra-
lizada (IGD, the Decentralized Management Index), which should help isolate
the influence of PBF coverage from occasional implementation problems (of
dated information in the Cadastro Único and faulty conditionality monitoring).
IGD was designed to support a performance-based financial incentive paid by
PBF to the municipalities. The goal was to encourage local governments to keep
Cadastro Único up-to-date and to oversee the meeting of program conditio-
nalities, explain Soares (2012) and Paiva et al. (2016).15 IGD ranges from zero
to one; the closer to one, the better the PBF management at the local level. Fur-
thermore, as discussed above, beyond the sheer amount of available resources,
aspects of quality in their application make a great deal of difference in fostering
HD. Quality may refer to more or less adequate choices made among policy al-
ternatives, which entail varying levels of efficiency, efficacy, effectiveness and
social justice. It may also regard operational capability to implement the chosen
policies, bringing to life expectations written down in intervention proposals
and laws. IGD is included as a control variable that also accounts for at least part
of the variation in local administrations’ competence to devise and execute
quality actions.
As far as the demand for education and health services, a younger popula-
tion imposes a stronger pressure on the primary and secondary schooling sys-
tem. It may also signal that ageing is less likely due to, for instance, urban
violence. Conversely, a larger per cent of 6-17 year-olds may represent a type of
demand that is “easier” to serve, since Schooling MHDI indicators of that age
bracket mostly regard enrollment, not graduation.16 Furthermore, a younger de-
mographic profile may also indicate reduced infant mortality and a prevalence
of (cheaper) prophylactic (versus more expensive therapeutic) treatment needs.
Similarly, a smaller share of senior citizens demands less of the health care ser-
vices, especially those to cope with chronic conditions (e.g., high blood pres-
sure, diabetes) and of higher complexity. Because the relationship between per
cent of 6-17 year-olds and social progress could defensibly go either way, no
specific hypothesis is defined for this covariate.
Moving to the variables that control for the number of inhabitants and their
spatial distribution, the more urbanized the municipality, the more likely it is to
perform well on HD, as previously discussed. With respect to the sheer size of
population, its influence could also go both ways: variety and complexity of de-
mands tend to be lower in smaller localities, however so too tend to be the avail-
ability of skilled government staff and response procedures to emerging needs.
The controls for initial HD level are expected to return positive coefficients,
given the convergence trends explored earlier; to avoid having a proxy of the
explained phenomenon among the independent variables, no “change” ana-
logues were defined for these two covariates.
IV.4. Adherence to multinomial logit assumptions
Multinomial models rest on the independence of irrelevant alternatives
(IIA) assumption, which requires that “adding or deleting outcomes does not af-
fect the odds among the remaining outcomes” (Long & Freese 2001, p.188). To
meet IIA, outcome alternatives must be dissimilar and not merely substitutes for
one another. This is a somewhat vague advice, and empirical tests developed for
IIA will not offer much more guidance. Long and Freese (2001) discourage the
use of such tests (e.g., Hausman and the Small-Hsiao) because they often reach
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14 Because the coverage
measure for PBF did suffer
methodological modifications






15 IGD is a simple average of
four indicators. Two
correspond to proportions of
families in the Cadastro Único
(with complete and coherent
information; and who last saw
a social worker in less than
two years). The other two are
the proportions of beneficiary
children with complete
monitoring of the education
and health conditionalities
(Soares 2012).
16 Schooling MHDI combines
five indicators: per cent of
population older than 18 that
graduated from middle school;
per cent of 18-20 year-olds
that graduated from high
school; per cent of 5-6
year-olds enrolled in school;
per cent of 11-13 year-olds
enrolled in the final grades of
middle school; and per cent of
15-17 year-olds that graduated
from middle school.
conflicting results. In this study, given the fact that the four groups do not cover
the entire range of possibilities - they do not include municipalities that fall
within confidence intervals - it is argued that these groups are not necessary sub-
stitutes.
Another assumption of the multinomial models is that the outcome levels
(groups) have no natural ordering. On a HD scale, it is clear that double social
loss fares more poorly than double social gain, however relative desirability be-
tween the two intermediate groups is much less evident. To test whether the two
latter groups should be meshed together - actually, to assess if any pair of groups
should be combined - Wald tests were conducted; results (not shown) indicate
that none of the four groups should be fused, at the 0.1 per cent level of signifi-
cance.
IV.5. Identification strategy
The identification strategy for the association between each covariate and
the probability that the municipality will fall in a certain group relies on: a) dif-
ferential levels of the independent variables as a source of variation among mu-
nicipalities; and b) an extensive set of controls covering demand for HD and
initial HD levels. As this work’s ambition is to explore associations, not to ex-
plain them, such identification strategy is deemed compatible with the present
research goals.
A challenge to internal validity is the fact that, concomitantly to the re-
sources and expenses visible in local budgets, state and federal governments are
acting through direct investments that affect HD (e.g., expanding the high
school system, building/ improving interstate highways). For such investments
not to bias estimated parameters, it would require to admit that the former are
homogeneously or randomly distributed; unobserved time-invariant cross-state
variability is controlled for by a set of dummies for states.
IV.6. The working sample
For the multinomial estimation, the number of observations is constrained
by Finbra – Finanças do Brasil and IFGF data availability, which forces the ex-
clusion of 137 (5.52 per cent) localities from the initial sample (n = 2,482).17 Ta-
ble 2 presents the mean value in each group for covariates in the multinomial
model and other selected variables, considering the working sample
(n = 2,345).18
The “change” Gini variable depicts (in Table 2) a scenario of decreasing per
capita household income inequality over the 2000s. Noteworthy, per cent of
children in households with no middle school graduates fell 20 per cent points
or more in all four groups. Budgetary indicators tended to change little from one
year to the next, except for the per capita total revenues, which grew on average
7.24 per cent each year, net of inflation.19 Per cent of own collection revenue
and per cent spent in health and sanitation increased by 0.26 and 0.59 per cent
point yearly, on average. On the other hand, the share of discretionary transfers
and expenditures on education and culture tended to shrink: 0.21 and 0.24 per
cent point a year. Initial IFGF components tended to be smaller (greater) in
group 1 (group 4) than in the other groups.
In the working sample, age profile seems to have grown older in the 2000s,
with a 5.65 per cent point average decline in the per cent of the 6-17-year-old
population over the decade. Urbanisation advanced 4.82 per cent points in ten
years, on average, while the total population increased 10.19 per cent between
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17 The 137 removed localities
are regionally distributed as
follows: 14 in Mid-West, 46 in
North, 60 in Northeast, 3 in
South, and 14 in Southeast. In
the initial sample, they
represent 7.37, 15.65, 6.70,
1.20, and 1.65 per cent of
municipalities in each region,
respectively. Almost all (134)
excluded municipalities lacked
2000 total revenue data, while
for some of these other budget
values were also absent; IFGF
was missing for other three
localities.
18 For parsimony, Table 3
does not include the state
dummies.
19 All money figures
presented in this work have
been adjusted for inflation
through the Índice Nacional de
Preços ao Consumidor (INPC,
the National Consumer Price
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Table 2 - Means of explanatory and other selected variables, by group
Variable All four
groups
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4
Influence on HD: Families
2000 Per capita income (in BRL 10s) 33,27 29,45 * 32,32 34,48 37,56 *
2000-2010 % change in per capita income 34,18 36,20 * 33,63 34,23 32,45 *
2000 Gini (0 - 100) 56,48 56,25 56,74 56,23 56,68
2000-2010 change in Gini (0 - 100) -7,10 -6,31 * -7,31 -7,33 -7,53
2000 % of children in households with no middle school
graduates
64,67 67,08 * 65,04 64,39 61,74 *
2000-2010 change in % of children in households with no
middle school graduates
-23,18 -19,98 * -20,32 * -27,24 * -26,20 *
Influence on HD: Governments
2000 per capita total revenues (in BRL 10s) 106,89 96,56 91,53 * 137,74 106,25
Average 2000-2010 y-to-y % change in per capita total
revenues
7,24 6,79 6,95 6,94 8,41
Average 2000-2010 % of municipality own collection
revenues
10,60 8,85 * 10,11 11,33 * 12,48 *
Average 2000-2010 y-to-y change in % of municipality
own collection revenues
0,26 0,24 0,27 0,29 0,27
Average 2002-2010 % of federal + state discretionary
transfers**
4,80 4,54 * 4,96 5,04 4,65
Average 2002-2010 y-to-y change in % of federal + state
discretionary transfers
-0,21 -0,28 -0,29 -0,13 -0,12 *
Average 2000-2010 % of total expenditures spent in edu-
cation and culture
32,21 32,71 * 31,49 * 32,97 * 31,73
Average 2000-2010 y-to-y change in % of total expendi-
tures spent in education and culture
-0,24 -0,25 -0,31 * -0,19 -0,21
Average 2000-2010 % of total expenditures spent in
health and sanitation
22,11 21,74 * 22,13 22,13 22,48 *
Average 2000-2010 y-to-y change in % of total expendi-
tures spent in health and sanitation
0,59 0,58 0,69 * 0,50 * 0,57
Average 2004-2010 % of Programa Bolsa Familia cover-
age
87,78 88,24 89,27 * 86,59 * 86,67
Average 2004-2010 y-to-y change in % of Programa
Bolsa Familia
5,93 6,04 5,61 * 6,19 5,95
Average 2007-2010 IGD (0 - 100) 76,36 77,05 * 76,14 76,65 75,56 *
Average 2007-2010 y-to-y change in IGD (0 - 100) 3,29 3,63 * 3,52 2,99 2,92 *
Average 2006-2010 IFGF (0 - 100) 48,24 45,27 * 47,25 * 50,06 * 51,00 *
Average 2006-2010 y-to-y change in IFGF (0 - 100) 0,17 0,04 0,39 0,15 0,10
Average 2006-2010 IFGF own revenues indicator (0 -
100)
20,93 17,15 * 19,98 22,56 * 24,77 *
Average 2006-2010 y-to-y change in IFGF own revenues
indicator (0 - 100)
0,23 0,35 0,08 0,27 0,23
Average 2006-2010 IFGF personnel expenditures indica-
tor (0 - 100)
61,95 59,73 * 59,88 * 63,96 * 64,95 *
Average 2006-2010 y-to-y change in IFGF personnel ex-
penditures indicator (0 - 100)
-2,53 -2,86 -2,22 -2,45 -2,60
Average 2006-2010 IFGF investments indicator (0 - 100) 53,18 50,69 * 51,65 * 56,39 * 54,64 *
Average 2006-2010 y-to-y change in IFGF investments
indicator (0 - 100)
0,81 1,16 0,91 0,50 0,60
Average 2006-2010 IFGF liquidity indicator (0 - 100) 42,91 38,62 * 43,76 43,80 45,94 *
2000 and 2010, on average. Initial Schooling MHDI levels in 2000 were less
than half those of the longevity dimensions.
V. Regression results
Estimations from the multinomial logit model are shown in Table 3. Specifi-
cations (1a) to (3a) concern Equation II and include dummies for states. Wald
tests for the null hypothesis that all the coefficients associated with a given vari-
able are jointly zero are presented in the rightmost column for 
 = 0.05. Specifi-
cations (1b) to (3b), shown in Appendix Table 1, replace the set of state
dummies with random intercepts for states; results are similar across the two
configurations.
Each ten-real raise in 2000 per capita income associated with a 3.1 per cent
higher RRR for the double social gain group. Each one per cent point increase in
the share of children in households with no middle school graduates seems to
decrease double social gain RRR by 12.8 per cent. Only five municipalities
(three in Minas Gerais and two in Mato Grosso) increased this indicator during
the 2000s.
Almost all of the parameters regarding local budgets are not statistically sig-
nificant. Out of ten covariates in each of the three estimations (1a to 3a), three
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Variable All four
groups
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4
Average 2006-2010 y-to-y change in IFGF liquidity indi-
cator (0 - 100)
2,19 1,49 * 2,60 2,48 2,23
Average 2006-2010 IFGF cost of debt indicator (0 - 100) 79,71 78,80 78,14 * 80,52 81,80 *
Average 2006-2010 y-to-y change in IFGF cost of debt
indicator (0 - 100)
0,15 0,07 0,79 * -0,31 * -0,07
Influence on HD: Demand for HD
2000 % of 6-17 year-old population 26,53 26,80 * 26,29 * 26,68 26,37
2000-2010 change in % of 6-17 year-old population -5,65 -5,57 -5,59 -5,73 -5,73
2000 % of population living in urban areas 58,27 54,66 * 57,90 59,90 61,21 *
2000-2010 change in % of population living in urban ar-
eas
4,82 5,14 4,56 5,01 4,57
2000 Population: From 20,001 to 50,000 0,19 0,19 0,21 0,19 0,17
2000 Population: From 50,001 to 100,000 0,05 0,04 * 0,04 * 0,07 * 0,07
2000 Population: 100,001+ 0,03 0,00 * 0,01 * 0,04 0,08 *
2000-2010 % change in total population 10,19 9,30 8,30 * 12,00 * 11,66 *
Influence on HD: Initial HD level
2000 Income MHDI quartile: Lowest 0,24 0,27 * 0,19 * 0,27 0,23
2000 Income MHDI 0,57 0,56 * 0,58 0,58 0,59 *
2000 Longevity MHDI quartile: Lowest 0,28 0,27 0,33 * 0,21 * 0,31
2000 Longevity MHDI 0,71 0,71 0,71 * 0,72 * 0,71
2000 Schooling MHDI quartile: Lowest 0,29 0,33 * 0,25 * 0,32 0,27
2000 Schooling MHDI 0,33 0,31 * 0,33 0,33 0,35 *
Observations 2.345 622 642 539 542
Source: The author, based on raw data from Atlas do Desenvolvimento Humano no Brasil; Finbra – Finanças do Brasil; Sistema
Firjan; Matriz de Informação Social.
Notes: (0-100) = In a 0 to 100 scale. * Statistically different from the remainder of the working sample’s mean at 
 = 0.05, ac-
cording to the unequal variance t test of means. ** Considering the whole set of municipalities for which information is avail-
able (n = 5,563), average 2002-2010 per cent federal and state discretionary transfers are 2.70 and 1.84, respectively.
Index), calculated by the
Brazilian census bureau;
reference date: August 1,
2010.
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Table 3 - Relative risk ratio estimates for the multinomial logit model with group affiliation as the dependent variable and dum-
mies for states
(1a) (2a) (3a) Wald test at 
 =
0.05 Rejects Ho:









Variable (group 2) (group 3) (group 4)
Influence on HD: Families
2000 Per capita income (in BRL 10s) 0.999 1.040*** 1.031** Yes
(0.012) (0.014) (0.013)
2000-2010% change in per capita income 0.993 1.005 1.007
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
2000 Gini (0 - 100) 1.017 0.968* 1.020 Yes
(0.017) (0.019) (0.020)
2000-2010 change in Gini (0 - 100) 1.013 0.978 1.016
(0.017) (0.020) (0.021)
2000% of children in households with no
middle school graduates
0.983 0.905*** 0.872*** Yes
(0.011) (0.013) (0.012)
2000-2010 change in % of children in house-
holds with no middle school graduates
0.974** 0.792*** 0.773*** Yes
(0.011) (0.013) (0.012)
Influence on HD: Governments
2000 per capital total revenues (in BRL 10s) 0.997** 1.000 1.000 Yes
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)








Average 2000-2010 y-to-y change in % of
municipality own collection revenues
1.027 1.033 1.011
(0.082) (0.093) (0.090)




Average 2002-2010 y-to-y change in % of
federal + state discretionary transfers
1.033 1.021 1.064
(0.056) (0.066) (0.067)
Average 2000-2010% of total expenditures
spent in education and culture
0.990 1.005 1.010
(0.015) (0.019) (0.019)
Average 2000-2010 y-to-y change in % of to-
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(1a) (2a) (3a) Wald test at 
 =
0.05 Rejects Ho:









Variable (group 2) (group 3) (group 4)
Average 2000-2010% of total expenditures
spent in health and sanitation
0.999 0.990 1.000
(0.017) (0.020) (0.020)
Average 2000-2010 y-to-y change in % of to-
tal expenditures spent in health and sanitation
1.091 1.086 1.122
(0.086) (0.102) (0.107)




Average 2004-2010 y-to-y change in %
Programa Bolsa Familia coverage
0.986 0.970* 0.965**
(0.014) (0.017) (0.017)
Average 2007-2010 Programa Bolsa Familia
IGD (0 - 100)
0.991 1.015 1.007
(0.010) (0.013) (0.012)
Average 2007-2010 y-to-y change in
Programa Bolsa Familia IGD (0 - 100)
0.999 0.987 0.998
(0.016) (0.019) (0.020)
Average 2006-2010 IFGF (0 - 100) 1.008 1.020** 1.017*
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009)




Influence on HD: Demand for HD
2000% of 6-17 y-o population 1.007 1.132** 1.086
(0.045) (0.062) (0.058)




2000% of population living in urban areas 0.999 0.994 0.989**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)




2000 Population: From 20,001 to 50,000 1.433* 1.012 1.378
(0.268) (0.213) (0.298)
2000 Population: From 50,001 to 100,000 1.404 1.779 2.518**
(0.516) (0.634) (0.911)
2000 Population: 100,001+ 2.267 6.258** 15.545*** Yes
(1.806) (4.562) (11.115)
2000-2010% change in total population 1.004 0.989** 0.996 Yes
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
show significance, and none is significant at 
 = 0.05 in more than one group
comparison. Per capita total revenues appear to have a slightly negative associa-
tion with the chances of falling into the longevity gain, schooling loss category
relative to double social loss (0.003 reduction in the RRR for each R$ 10, ceteris
paribus). This suggests that local budgetary resources in general - regardless of
their sources and apportionment - cannot veer municipalities away from a dou-
ble social loss, all else constant.
Per cent of federal plus state discretionary transfers20 positively correlates
with escaping double social loss: one per cent point increase in discretionary
transfers is estimated to raise in 6.3 per cent the risk ratio of falling into the lon-
gevity gain, schooling loss category. Since per capita revenues are held con-
stant, this finding underscores the importance of intergovernmental transfers in
compounding local budgets.
Specification (3a) detected a statistically significant connection between
expenditures and group membership, but only via growth in the education and
culture share of expenditures. This association was calculated to be in the neigh-
bourhood of a 25 per cent increase in the double social gain RRR for each one
per cent point increase in average year-to-year change, all else constant - which
is a variation well above this explanatory variable’s mean, of negative 0.24 (Ta-
ble 2). Random intercepts specifications return only marginally significant as-
sociations for this covariate (Appendix Table 1).
The spreading pace of PBF shows a statistically significant coefficient, sug-
gesting that as this program advanced towards full reach of the target group, the
higher became the chance of falling into a double social loss. This may be the re-
sult of successful attempts to reach the most vulnerable persons, who may con-
centrate in municipalities that were least able to escape social losses.21
A one-point improvement in IFGF associates with a 1.7 per cent increase in
the RRR for group 4, ceteris paribus. Since own collection (one of IFGF’s di-
mensions) is held constant, this result is net of the partial redundancy between
these two variables - which display a 0.528 correlation coefficient22 - and re-
gards mostly the other four IFGF components.
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(1a) (2a) (3a) Wald test at 
 =
0.05 Rejects Ho:









Variable (group 2) (group 3) (group 4)
Influence on HD: Initial HD level
2000 Longevity MHDI quartile: Lowest 4.628*** 0.979 4.016*** Yes
(1.058) (0.241) (1.056)
2000 Schooling MHDI quartile: Lowest 0.785 3.387*** 2.877*** Yes
(0.168) (0.876) (0.751)
Constant 0.229 0.088 0.022 N.a.
(0.476) (0.208) (0.054)
Observations 2,345 2,345 2,345 N.a.
Notes: Calculated with robust standard errors. Mean Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) = 2.10; maximum VIF = 7.92. Pseudo-R2
for specifications (1a) to (3a) is 0.245. (0 – 100) = In a 0 to 100 scale. N.a. = Not applicable. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
Source: The author, based on raw data from Atlas do Desenvolvimento Humano no Brasil; Finbra – Finanças do Brasil; Sistema
Firjan; Matriz de Informação Social.
20 These transfers do not
include SUS transfers.
21 During Brazil’s boom years
(for most of the 2000s),
municipalities in a stalled
economy may be the most
poorly administered. In these
areas, federal programs
implemented at the local level,
such as PBF, may also suffer
The younger the age profile, the more likely that a municipality will belong
to group 3 (longevity loss, schooling gain) in relation to group 1 (double social
loss), whereas urbanization seems to constrict chances of double social gain.23
Neither age profile nor urbanisation return statistically significant coefficients
in the random intercepts specifications (1b to 3b). Covariates concerning popu-
lation size indicate that greater populaces are more likely to prevent double so-
cial loss and that such association is more intense the larger the population.
Municipalities with over fifty thousand residents seem dramatically more likely
to fall in groups 3 and 4, both of which imply schooling gains: RRRs are esti-
mated to increase by a factor of two to fifteen, ceteris paribus. Population
growth, nonetheless, returned a negative effect on the likelihood of pertaining to
group 3, statistically significant in (2a) but not in (2b).
Aligned with the convergence pattern captured when groups were formed,
initial schooling and longevity levels show a negative association with social
gains. Being in the lowest 2000 longevity (schooling) quartile inflates by about
three (two) times the probability of double social gains.
To check the results’ sensitivity to the multinomial modelling, four logit re-
gressions were estimated (Appendix Table 2). All have a dummy for double so-
cial gain as the dependent variable. Specifications (4a) and (4b) considered only
the subsample of group 1 and group 4 municipalities, while (5a) and (5b) in-
clude the entire working sample. Specifications ending in “a” contain dummies
for states, while those ending in “b” display random intercepts for states. In the
four models, results are similar to those found through the multinomial analysis,
with three exceptions. First, in (4a) own collection shows a negative and signifi-
cant effect; second, in (4b) average 2000-2010 year-to-year change in private
collection displays odds ratio around 1.2, and significant at 
 = 0.05. Possibly,
such difference in results is due to subsampling, with only the “extreme” groups
1 and 4 present. The third difference is that discretionary transfers are not statis-
tically significant in the logit models.
VI. Conclusion
The research aimed at shedding light on the somewhat disjoint economic
and social progress. To do that, examined municipalities making substantial
strides towards improved longevity and schooling despite their dismal eco-
nomic performance. Not the least, learning about characteristics shared by such
localities is of interest to any shielding effort against downturns.
Leveraging causal claims on HD from a broad range of literature, I argue
that public policy from central and local governments can have substantive ef-
fects on HD, net of variations on families’ income. From this standpoint, public
spending schedules could promote HD advancements amidst an unfavourable
economy. I adapt the causal claims, from their original cross-country perspec-
tive to the institutional setting of Brazilian municipalities.
The preceding analysis suggests that, in a stalled or slow economy, the prob-
ability of social improvement is sensitive to families’ income level, educational
achievement in households with children, local budget composition and appor-
tionment, age and size of the population, and already existing HD levels. Note-
worthy, urbanisation did not seem to associate with advances in the social HD
dimensions, all else constant.
Evidence gathered supports the proposed argument. Zooming in on govern-
ments’ influence over the chances to escape double social loss, budgetary
sources and spending appear to be more critical than sheer budget: ceteris pari-
bus, models fail to capture a positive impact of the per capita total budget. Dis-
cretionary transfers, while not explicitly designed to be redistributive, may
work to that end and seem to help avoid double social loss in lagging local econ-
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from weak management, and
that could be a potential
explanation for the regression
results about PBF.
22 p-value = 0.000; n = 2,345
(the working sample).
23 The sheer positive
correlation between per cent
urban and population size, of
moderate magnitude (0.294,
p-value = 0.000) in the
working sample (n = 2,345),
would not be expected to be
pulling significance from
urbanisation.
omies. Moreover, growing education spending shows a positive association
with double social gain. Fiscal health, as captured by IFGF, too correlates with a
drop in the likelihood of social loss.
Together, findings regarding the impact of education expenditures and the
lingering effects of low schooling (captured by the per cent of children in house-
holds without middle school graduates) tell a story of intergenerational trans-
mission of HD, and the role of the State in breaking the vicious cycle of handed
down inequality. The fact that growth in education spending seems to help HD,
while total revenue per se does not sport the same effect, suggests that policy
priorities matter, beyond investment capacity.
Admittedly, several questions remain unanswered. Given the option to fo-
cus on municipalities with less than expected EG, this research does not inform
on how HD behaves in thriving locales, nor on those that grew within the ex-
pected bounds. Also, I have not addressed the dynamic relationship between EG
and HD - which could have implications as far as the sequencing of policy (e.g.,
invest in HD first or raise income first).
Moreover, this study does not deal with the reasons why certain municipali-
ties receive more discretionary inflows or invest more in education than others,
nor does it dissects the application of such funds. While decentralised public
health care is highly regulated, with municipalities having to adhere to service
provision protocols to secure SUS resources, how local governments spend in
education is a far less constrained decision, giving up to greater variation in ser-
vices offered across the country. With a positive predicted effect on HD, the fis-
cal health indicator (IFGF) too underscores the existence of room for local
decisions (e.g., regarding investment and indebtedness) that seem to matter to
HD. A possible account sheds light on covariates’ initial levels. In 2000,
Schooling MHDI averages were half that of Longevity MHDI; assuming dimin-
ishing returns of resources spent, money assigned to education would naturally
yield higher a return. As far as fiscal health, initial IFGF components tended to
be greater in the double social gain municipalities, and that advantageous legacy
could be part of the explanation for their relative success in the subsequent de-
cade.
Despite the relevance of angles not explored here, this article contributes to
the literature in a variety of ways. First, it poses a practical question, which
should interest academics and practitioners alike. Second, it articulates different
fields of study, combining references from Development Studies, Political Sci-
ence, and Education to elaborate an encompassing model for local HD. Third,
besides the observational nature of the research design, the findings bear credi-
bility as the analyses incorporate numerous controls and take advantage of lon-
gitudinal data wherever possible, holding constant a great many influences over
HD.
Having established the boundaries and contributions of the study, its conclu-
sion can be better understood. Piecing together the evidence amassed, escaping
double social loss seems to hinge upon a variety of actors of differing spheres,
looking more likely the higher the initial income and schooling levels, the
greater the discretionary federal and state-level inflow, the growth in local edu-
cation investments, and the fiscal health. A more balanced countrywide distri-
bution of family and government resources foreshadows lesser vulnerability
through rainy days.
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Em tempos difíceis: avançando educação e saúde a despeito de uma economia local desfavorável
RESUMO Introdução: Embora os padrões de vida tenham melhorado substancialmente no Brasil, os últimos anos testemunharam
uma economia com crescimento lento, levantando preocupações sobre se as melhorias em educação e saúde pública se
consolidariam. São colocadas questões sobre como os governos de todo o país podem se proteger contra a turbulência econômica e
continuar melhorando as condições sociais mesmo em períodos críticos. Especificamente, quais políticas públicas podem sustentar
ou mesmo aumentar o desenvolvimento humano (DH) na ausência de crescimento econômico (CE)? Materiais e Métodos: Este
estudo explora as características sociodemográficas e orçamentárias dos municípios brasileiros que apresentaram crescimento menor
do que o esperado na dimensão renda do Índice de Desenvolvimento Humano Municipal (IDH), mas avançaram mais que o esperado
na escolaridade e expectativa de vida. Municípios cuja renda per capita média avançou menos do que o previsto foram agrupados de
acordo com o crescimento das dimensões sociais do IDHM. As chances de cair em um determinado grupo foram estimadas através de
um modelo logit multinomial. Resultados: A análise sugere que, em uma economia paralisada ou lenta, a probabilidade de melhoria
social é sensível ao nível de renda das famílias, alcance educacional em famílias com crianças, composição e alocação do orçamento
local, idade e tamanho da população e níveis de DH já existentes. Discussão: O artigo argumenta que influências não relacionadas à
renda - ou seja, políticas públicas de governos centrais e locais - podem ter efeitos substanciais sobre o DH, contendo perdas ou
mesmo promovendo avanços do DH em meio a uma economia desfavorável. Tal afirmação se baseia em trabalhos de estudos de
desenvolvimento, adaptando-os da perspectiva comparativa entre países para o nível entre municípios. Além disso, pesquisas sobre
descentralização e federalismo fiscal fornecem fundamentos para ajustar o modelo teórico. Uma distribuição nacional mais
equilibrada de recursos familiares e governamentais antecipa menor vulnerabilidade em tempos críticos.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: desenvolvimento humano, crescimento econômico, gasto social, município, Brasil.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License which permits
unrestricted non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium provided the original work is properly cited.
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Appendix tables
Table 1A - Relative risk ratio estimates for the multinomial logit model with group affiliation as the dependent variable and
state random intercepts






(group 2) (group 3) (group 4)
Influence on HD: Families
2000 Per capita income (in BRL 10s) 1.003 1.031** 1.043***
(0.010) (0.015) (0.014)
2000-2010% change in per capita income 0.994 1.006 1.007
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
2000 Gini (0 - 100) 1.005 0.987 1.013
(0.023) (0.022) (0.032)
2000-2010 change in Gini (0 - 100) 1.000 0.994 1.013
(0.017) (0.024) (0.031)




2000-2010 change in % of children in households
with no middle school graduates
0.981 0.776*** 0.770***
(0.012) (0.016) (0.009)
Influence on HD: Governments
2000 per capital total revenues (in BRL 10s) 0.996*** 1.000 1.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)








Average 2000-2010 y-to-y change in % of munici-
pality own collection revenues
1.026 1.057 1.049
(0.061) (0.058) (0.063)












Average 2000-2010 y-to-y change in % of total ex-
penditures spent in education and culture
1.043 1.168* 1.186*
(0.059) (0.109) (0.117)
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(group 2) (group 3) (group 4)




Average 2000-2010 y-to-y change in % of total ex-
penditures spent in health and sanitation
1.145* 0.975 1.075
(0.087) (0.118) (0.091)












Average 2007-2010 y-to-y change in Programa Bolsa
Familia IGD (0 - 100)
0.993 0.997 0.993
(0.017) (0.029) (0.024)
Average 2006-2010 IFGF (0 - 100) 1.008 1.020** 1.024***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.008)
Average 2006-2010 y-to-y change in IFGF (0 - 100) 1.017 0.987 0.987
(0.014) (0.017) (0.016)
Influence on HD: Demand for HD
2000% of 6-17 y-o population 0.986 1.105 1.108
(0.050) (0.079) (0.093)
2000-2010 change in % of 6-17 y-o population 1.005 1.070 1.068
(0.051) (0.074) (0.093)
2000% of population living in urban areas 0.998 0.998 0.990
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007)




2000 Population: From 20 001 to 50 000 1.272 1.214 1.161
(0.241) (0.214) (0.252)
2000 Population: From 50 001 to 100 000 1.118 2.136*** 1.961
(0.650) (0.597) (0.898)
2000 Population: 100 001+ 1.372 7.667*** 10.739***
(1.480) (4.250) (6.757)
2000-2010% change in total population 0.999 0.994 0.994
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Influence on HD: Initial HD level
2000 Longevity MHDI quartile: Lowest 3.297*** 1.110 4.614***
(1.217) (0.303) (1.165)
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(group 2) (group 3) (group 4)
2000 Schooling MHDI quartile: Lowest 0.725** 4.383*** 3.050***
(0.107) (1.430) (0.749)
Constant 6.596 0.005 0.031
(8.681) (0.016) (0.093)
Observations 2 345 2 345 2 345
Notes: Calculated with robust standard errors. (0-100) = In a 0 to 100 scale. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
Source: The author, based on raw data from Atlas do Desenvolvimento Humano no Brasil; Finbra – Finanças do Brasil; Sistema
Firjan; Matriz de Informação Social.
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Table 2A - Odds ratio estimates for the logit models with affiliation to group 4 (double social gain) as the dependent variable













Influence on HD: Families
2000 Per capita income (in BRL 10s) 1.020 1.029 1.011 1.017**
(0.015) (0.018) (0.009) (0.008)
2000-2010% change in per capita income 0.998 1.001 1.006 1.007**
(0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.003)
2000 Gini (0 - 100) 1.025 1.019 1.029* 1.024
(0.026) (0.042) (0.017) (0.021)
2000-2010 change in Gini (0 - 100) 1.037 1.026 1.021 1.016
(0.028) (0.044) (0.017) (0.021)
2000% of children in households with no middle
school graduates
0.849*** 0.854*** 0.914*** 0.917***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.010) (0.016)
2000-2010 change in % of children in households
with no middle school graduates
0.745*** 0.745*** 0.865*** 0.865***
(0.018) (0.013) (0.010) (0.017)
Influence on HD: Governments
2000 per capital total revenues (in BRL 10s) 0.998 0.999 1.000*** 1.000***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)
Average 2000-2010 y-to-y % change in per capita
total revenues
1.001 1.001 1.005 1.005
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007)
Average 2000-2010% of municipality own col-
lection revenues
0.963** 0.967* 0.987 0.986
(0.016) (0.020) (0.011) (0.010)
Average 2000-2010 y-to-y change in % of munic-
ipality own collection revenues
1.233* 1.232** 0.992 0.996
(0.149) (0.126) (0.068) (0.068)
Average 2002-2010% of federal + state discre-
tionary transfers
0.992 0.992 0.985 0.984
(0.033) (0.036) (0.021) (0.022)
Average 2002-2010 y-to-y change in % of federal
+ state discretionary transfers
1.088 1.088 1.046 1.044
(0.097) (0.074) (0.050) (0.047)
Average 2000-2010% of total expenditures spent
in education and culture
1.015 1.009 1.010 1.005
(0.022) (0.029) (0.015) (0.016)
Average 2000-2010 y-to-y change in % of total
expenditures spent in education and culture
1.178 1.148* 1.163** 1.136**
(0.117) (0.094) (0.087) (0.071)
Average 2000-2010% of total expenditures spent
in health and sanitation
1.007 1.011 1.006 1.006
(0.024) (0.022) (0.015) (0.016)
Average 2000-2010 y-to-y change in % of total
expenditures spent in health and sanitation
1.074 1.068 1.040 1.040
(0.114) (0.102) (0.078) (0.060)
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Average 2004-2010% Programa Bolsa Familia
coverage
0.998 0.999 0.999 0.999
(0.007) (0.010) (0.005) (0.004)
Average 2004-2010 y-to-y change in % Programa
Bolsa Familia coverage
0.954** 0.958** 0.981 0.980
(0.021) (0.021) (0.013) (0.013)
Average 2007-2010 Programa Bolsa Familia IGD
(0 - 100)
0.999 0.996 1.002 0.999
(0.014) (0.014) (0.010) (0.011)
Average 2007-2010 y-to-y change in Programa
Bolsa Familia IGD (0 - 100)
0.990 0.990 1.006 1.003
(0.025) (0.025) (0.016) (0.012)
Average 2006-2010 IFGF (0 - 100) 1.021** 1.024*** 1.003 1.006
(0.011) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006)
Average 2006-2010 y-to-y change in IFGF (0 -
100)
0.987 0.991 0.985 0.987
(0.024) (0.020) (0.016) (0.017)
Influence on HD: Demand for HD
2000% of 6-17 y-o population 1.042 1.043 1.013 1.015
(0.068) (0.095) (0.042) (0.055)
2000-2010 change in % of 6-17 y-o population 1.045 1.060 0.999 1.002
(0.078) (0.121) (0.045) (0.057)
2000% of population living in urban areas 0.985** 0.985* 0.991** 0.991*
(0.006) (0.009) (0.004) (0.005)
2000-2010 change in % of population living in
urban areas
1.004 0.998 1.001 0.999
(0.016) (0.012) (0.010) (0.007)
2000 Population: From 20,001 to 50,000 1.432 1.282 1.216 1.151
(0.375) (0.271) (0.203) (0.175)
2000 Population: From 50,001 to 100,000 3.631*** 2.828** 1.669* 1.556*
(1.612) (1.474) (0.451) (0.389)
2000 Population: 100,001+ 17.052*** 12.809*** 3.864*** 3.470***
(12.644) (9.543) (1.393) (0.911)
2000-2010% change in total population 0.998 0.995 1.001 0.999
(0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Influence on HD: Initial HD level
2000 Longevity MHDI quartile: Lowest 5.208*** 5.088*** 2.608*** 2.566***
(1.636) (1.638) (0.559) (0.710)
2000 Schooling MHDI quartile: Lowest 4.233*** 3.847*** 1.772*** 1.732***
(1.359) (1.098) (0.359) (0.367)
Constant 0.243 0.899 0.059 0.178
(0.713) (2.480) (0.119) (0.389)
Observations 1,163 1,164 2,345 2,345
Dummies for states Yes Yes
Random intercepts for states Yes Yes
Notes: Calculated with robust standard errors. Pseudo-R2 for specifications (4a) and (5a) are 0.465 and 0.202, respectively.
(0-100) = In a 0 to 100 scale. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
Source: The author, based on raw data from Atlas do Desenvolvimento Humano no Brasil; Finbra – Finanças do Brasil; Sistema
Firjan; Matriz de Informação Social.
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